#5 – The Arab nations threatened Israel with annihilation in 1967 and 1973
Claim: Israel was the aggressor in 1967, there was no imminent threat. The 1973 surprise attack by the Arabs was justified.
The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis
Egypt was never a victim. Under the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which Egypt signed, it ensured that, “The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.” However in 1949, continuing it's hostilities toward Israel, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and cargoes, illegally blocking the canal. The consequences not only affected Israel but the financial and strategic interests of the United Kingdom and France as well. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche said, “There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements.”
On September 1, 1951, the Security Council ordered Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt refused to comply. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salah al-Din, said early in 1954 that, “The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East.” (Al-Misri, April 12, 1954). It was during the period that a new type of warfare began to emerge. Egypt had begun to train and equip the Fedayeen in terrorist attacks against Israel. In 1955 Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser said, “Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes (the Fedayeen), the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.” –August 31st, 1955.
In 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, repudiating the treaties concluded with Britain and France, and blockaded Israel's shipping land in the Straights of Tiran. Meanwhile the Fedayeen intensified their attacks.
By all accounts the blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased Fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of Arab statements was tantamount to an act of war. Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, attacked Egypt on October 29, 1956.
"During the six years during which this belligerency (Egypt) has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and Fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded." -Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban
The 1967 Six-Day War
Israel’s preemptive attacks was justifiable by the hostilities that began prior to the Six Day War. Syria used the Golan Heights to shell Israeli farms and villages, Egypt was threatening Israel, and Arab terrorists were increasingly attacking Israel. On May 15, 1967 Egyptian troops massed near the Israeli border. On May 18 Syrian troops massed along the Golan Heights. And on May 22 Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran.
Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000 tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel. Blockading the Straights of Tiran cut off Israel's route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from it's main supplier Iran. Such provocations would not be tolerated by any other country and ensured that war was inevitable.
Following the six-day war Israel captured the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and the West Bank. Israel was justified in keeping these territories not only as a buffer zone against future attacks, but to demonstrate to the Arabs that provocation would not come without consequences.
"The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations." -Nassar May 1967
"As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence." –the Voice of the Arabs radio station proclaimed on May 18, 1967. Source:Isi Leibler, The Case For Israel, (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), pp. 60–61.
"Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united. . . . I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." -Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad, May 20th 1967
Jewish quotes
The author purports several quotes that seem to portray Israel as the aggressor. These cherry picked quotes are often taken out of context and parroted on Anti-Israel sites as “proof” Israel was the aggressor. For instance, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin admits that, “In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” While this quote is true it is also lacks proper context. What follows is what Menachem Begin said in full:
“In June, 1967 we again had a choice [as in 1956]. The Egyptian army concentration in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him. [But] This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term. The government of national unity then established decided unanimously: We will take the initiative and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of Israel and the future of the nation.”
…There is no decisive mandate to go to war only if there is no alternative. There is no moral imperative that a nation must, or is entitled to, fight only when its back is to the sea, or the abyss. Such a war may avert tragedy, if not a Holocaust, for any nation; but it causes it terrible loss of life .... A free, sovereign nation, which hates war and loves peace, and which is concerned about its security, must create the conditions under which war, if there is a need for it, will not be for lack of alternatives. The conditions must be such — and their creation depends upon man’s reason and his actions — that the price of victory will be few casualties, not many.” –Menachem Begin, Aug. 8, 1982 speech to Israel’s National Defense College, speaking of the Six-Day War. (Source:Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America)
In full context Menachem Begin actually defends Israel’s actions as self-defense and not as an act of aggression. Next Yitzhak Rabin is quoted as saying, “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it.” Again, context is everything. The quote is taken from an article entitled "General Rabin did not think Nasser wanted war":
“Question: Do you think Nasser pretended to believe your threats because he was trying to provoke a war?
Yitzhak Rabin: I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on 14 May would not have been enough to trigger an offensive against Israel. He knew, and we knew it. This demonstrates, in my view, that Nasser did not believe that we would attack Syria. He was bluffing; he wanted to present a good price, as the savior of Syria and thus gain broad sympathy in the Arab world. We knew the scheme since he had already used in 1960 at the time of the Egyptian-Syrian union. Following a raid that we conducted in the DMZ, it had concentrated troops, believing that we were planning an attack. A month later, he withdrew ensuring that the Syrians had managed to scare us. But there eight years, he had not requested the withdrawal of UN forces. This time, he felt the need to give more credibility to his bluff. Indeed, propaganda Arab anti-Nasser prompted him to end the constantly accusing him of "hiding behind the international forces."
Question: Why did he do it because he does not want war and he knew, moreover, that your army was superior to his?
Yitzhak Rabin: This is where our logic does not match that of the Arabs. These rarely distinguish between reality and dreams. Nasser was intoxicated by the surge of popular enthusiasm in the Arab world, as well as its own propaganda. He came to believe that the Egyptian army was not defeated by Israel in 1956, but only by the Franco-British intervention. He then built a whole system of thought, that Israel would not take the initiative of hostilities in 1967 because he could not rely, as in 1956, on the support of foreign powers. Judging by the seven divisions he sent into Sinai after the closure of Aqaba, yet he knew that we would consider his actions as a casus belli.
Question: The partial blockade of Aqaba was not however a matter of life or death for the State of Israel, which could ensure its supplies through Haifa, as was the case before 1956. Moreover, President Nasser, you probably know, was willing to make concessions for the passage of oil, among others. Why have you started the war forty-eight hours before the arrival in Washington of Mr. Zakaria Mohyeddine who went there specifically to negotiate a settlement?
Yitzhak Rabin: The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, in itself, I repeat, was for us a casus belli. However, fundamentally, the war was caused by a combination of local and international factors. The negative role of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the passions and hatred prevailing in the region.” -Source: Le Monde, 29 February 1968 (translated from French)
Yitzhak Rabin is saying here that Nassar may not have wanted a war, but he became overconfident and backed himself in a corner. Israel had been on alert for weeks and could not remain mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow the Gulf of Aqaba to be closed. Hammond's quote omits the May 14 date as do many, but not all, sources of this quote. However the date is important. Many things happened between May 14th and June 5th. Egypt ordered the UN peacekeepers to leave, Egypt blockaded Israel's Red Sea Port. Egypt moved another 5 divisions to the Israeli Border, 100,000 troops in all. And Israel was being threatened with genocide.
The author also quotes General Ezer Weizman (Ha' aretz, March 29), Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev (Ma’ariv, April 4, 1972), Mordecai Bentov (Al-Hamishmar, April 14, 1971), and General Chaim Herzog (Ma' ariv, April 4, 1972). I have not been able to confirm any of these quotes, but again without context it's meaningless.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Part 6
Claim: Israel was the aggressor in 1967, there was no imminent threat. The 1973 surprise attack by the Arabs was justified.
The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis
Egypt was never a victim. Under the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which Egypt signed, it ensured that, “The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.” However in 1949, continuing it's hostilities toward Israel, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and cargoes, illegally blocking the canal. The consequences not only affected Israel but the financial and strategic interests of the United Kingdom and France as well. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche said, “There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements.”
On September 1, 1951, the Security Council ordered Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt refused to comply. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salah al-Din, said early in 1954 that, “The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East.” (Al-Misri, April 12, 1954). It was during the period that a new type of warfare began to emerge. Egypt had begun to train and equip the Fedayeen in terrorist attacks against Israel. In 1955 Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser said, “Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes (the Fedayeen), the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.” –August 31st, 1955.
In 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, repudiating the treaties concluded with Britain and France, and blockaded Israel's shipping land in the Straights of Tiran. Meanwhile the Fedayeen intensified their attacks.
By all accounts the blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased Fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of Arab statements was tantamount to an act of war. Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, attacked Egypt on October 29, 1956.
"During the six years during which this belligerency (Egypt) has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and Fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded." -Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban
The 1967 Six-Day War
Israel’s preemptive attacks was justifiable by the hostilities that began prior to the Six Day War. Syria used the Golan Heights to shell Israeli farms and villages, Egypt was threatening Israel, and Arab terrorists were increasingly attacking Israel. On May 15, 1967 Egyptian troops massed near the Israeli border. On May 18 Syrian troops massed along the Golan Heights. And on May 22 Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran.
Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000 tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel. Blockading the Straights of Tiran cut off Israel's route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from it's main supplier Iran. Such provocations would not be tolerated by any other country and ensured that war was inevitable.
Following the six-day war Israel captured the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and the West Bank. Israel was justified in keeping these territories not only as a buffer zone against future attacks, but to demonstrate to the Arabs that provocation would not come without consequences.
"The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations." -Nassar May 1967
"As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence." –the Voice of the Arabs radio station proclaimed on May 18, 1967. Source:Isi Leibler, The Case For Israel, (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), pp. 60–61.
"Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united. . . . I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." -Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad, May 20th 1967
Jewish quotes
The author purports several quotes that seem to portray Israel as the aggressor. These cherry picked quotes are often taken out of context and parroted on Anti-Israel sites as “proof” Israel was the aggressor. For instance, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin admits that, “In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” While this quote is true it is also lacks proper context. What follows is what Menachem Begin said in full:
“In June, 1967 we again had a choice [as in 1956]. The Egyptian army concentration in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him. [But] This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term. The government of national unity then established decided unanimously: We will take the initiative and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of Israel and the future of the nation.”
…There is no decisive mandate to go to war only if there is no alternative. There is no moral imperative that a nation must, or is entitled to, fight only when its back is to the sea, or the abyss. Such a war may avert tragedy, if not a Holocaust, for any nation; but it causes it terrible loss of life .... A free, sovereign nation, which hates war and loves peace, and which is concerned about its security, must create the conditions under which war, if there is a need for it, will not be for lack of alternatives. The conditions must be such — and their creation depends upon man’s reason and his actions — that the price of victory will be few casualties, not many.” –Menachem Begin, Aug. 8, 1982 speech to Israel’s National Defense College, speaking of the Six-Day War. (Source:Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America)
In full context Menachem Begin actually defends Israel’s actions as self-defense and not as an act of aggression. Next Yitzhak Rabin is quoted as saying, “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it.” Again, context is everything. The quote is taken from an article entitled "General Rabin did not think Nasser wanted war":
“Question: Do you think Nasser pretended to believe your threats because he was trying to provoke a war?
Yitzhak Rabin: I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on 14 May would not have been enough to trigger an offensive against Israel. He knew, and we knew it. This demonstrates, in my view, that Nasser did not believe that we would attack Syria. He was bluffing; he wanted to present a good price, as the savior of Syria and thus gain broad sympathy in the Arab world. We knew the scheme since he had already used in 1960 at the time of the Egyptian-Syrian union. Following a raid that we conducted in the DMZ, it had concentrated troops, believing that we were planning an attack. A month later, he withdrew ensuring that the Syrians had managed to scare us. But there eight years, he had not requested the withdrawal of UN forces. This time, he felt the need to give more credibility to his bluff. Indeed, propaganda Arab anti-Nasser prompted him to end the constantly accusing him of "hiding behind the international forces."
Question: Why did he do it because he does not want war and he knew, moreover, that your army was superior to his?
Yitzhak Rabin: This is where our logic does not match that of the Arabs. These rarely distinguish between reality and dreams. Nasser was intoxicated by the surge of popular enthusiasm in the Arab world, as well as its own propaganda. He came to believe that the Egyptian army was not defeated by Israel in 1956, but only by the Franco-British intervention. He then built a whole system of thought, that Israel would not take the initiative of hostilities in 1967 because he could not rely, as in 1956, on the support of foreign powers. Judging by the seven divisions he sent into Sinai after the closure of Aqaba, yet he knew that we would consider his actions as a casus belli.
Question: The partial blockade of Aqaba was not however a matter of life or death for the State of Israel, which could ensure its supplies through Haifa, as was the case before 1956. Moreover, President Nasser, you probably know, was willing to make concessions for the passage of oil, among others. Why have you started the war forty-eight hours before the arrival in Washington of Mr. Zakaria Mohyeddine who went there specifically to negotiate a settlement?
Yitzhak Rabin: The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, in itself, I repeat, was for us a casus belli. However, fundamentally, the war was caused by a combination of local and international factors. The negative role of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the passions and hatred prevailing in the region.” -Source: Le Monde, 29 February 1968 (translated from French)
Yitzhak Rabin is saying here that Nassar may not have wanted a war, but he became overconfident and backed himself in a corner. Israel had been on alert for weeks and could not remain mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow the Gulf of Aqaba to be closed. Hammond's quote omits the May 14 date as do many, but not all, sources of this quote. However the date is important. Many things happened between May 14th and June 5th. Egypt ordered the UN peacekeepers to leave, Egypt blockaded Israel's Red Sea Port. Egypt moved another 5 divisions to the Israeli Border, 100,000 troops in all. And Israel was being threatened with genocide.
The author also quotes General Ezer Weizman (Ha' aretz, March 29), Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev (Ma’ariv, April 4, 1972), Mordecai Bentov (Al-Hamishmar, April 14, 1971), and General Chaim Herzog (Ma' ariv, April 4, 1972). I have not been able to confirm any of these quotes, but again without context it's meaningless.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Part 6
